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POTENTIAL PRODUCTION: A SUPPLY SIDE APPROACH FOR
RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITIONS
INTRODUCTION

The scope of the relevant product market' is often the crucial issuez in
1. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26. 336 (1962); United States v
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) (Cellophane). See generally 2
P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law
5 17-21 (1978); R. Posner, Antitrust Law 125-34 (1976);
F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure & Economic Performance 52-57 (1970), L- Sullivan,
Handbook of the Law of Antitrust §§ 12-18, 203a-b (1977). Frequently, courts have found it
necessary to determine the sphere in which an anticompetitive effect takes place. See, e g,
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974); United States v Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (GM); United States v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co.. 351 U.S 377, 393
(1956) (Cellophane). In antitrust terms, this is the relevant market and it has two aspects: product
and geographic. See generally 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra, W 500-536f; L. Sullivan, supra,
§§ 11-21, 203.
2. The vast majority of the cases cited in this Note turn on relevant market definition.
Generally, courts have equated market power with the percentage of the relevant market See,
e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966), United States v Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-74 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424
(2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). The relevant product market definition is important because the larger the
percentage, the larger the likelihood of an antitrust violation. Defendants that allegedly have
violated the antitrust laws, therefore, generally will prefer a broader market definition, while the
plaintiff generally will prefer a narrower market definition. For example, defendant Du Pont had
75% of the cellophane market, but only 12.75% of the flexible wrapping materials market- See
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 383-84, 399 (1956) (Cellophane.
The Grinnell Corporation had a small percentage of the business of providing some kind of
property protective service from a central location, but had 87% of the accredited central service
security systems market. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 567, 572 n.6 (1966).
In both cases only the larger percentage would have suggested monopoly power- 35 1 U.S. at 404,
see 384 U.S. at 567, 572 n.6. A larger market share would also increase the likelihood of illegality
of mergers. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S 271, 280 (1964) (Rome
Cable); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343 (1962). But see United States v. General Dynamics Corp , 415
U.S. 486, 511 (1974) (the majority upheld a merger "[i]rrespective" of the market question); zd. at
522 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (the dissent bemoaned the lack of market share analysis). See
generally Comment, Antitrust Law-Market Share Analysis-Clayon Act, Section 7--United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 20 N.Y.L.F. 848 (1975). There are instances, however, when
a defendant would prefer a narrow market definition. First, a narrow market definition would
limit the breadth of the remedy available, thereby diminishing the effect of a loss on defendant's
business. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966); L G. Balfour
Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 10-11 (7th Cir. 1971). Second, a defendant would prefer a narrow
market so that the merging companies would be in two separate markets and not subject to
antitrust scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U S. 441, 452-55 09%4),
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294. 326 (1962), Beatrice Foods Co v- FTC, 540
F.2d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 1976). Potential competition theory, however, can undercut this rationale
because it asserts that an effect on competition can be exerted without actual presence in the
relevant market and the elimination of this effect can be illegal. Markov'its, Predicting the
Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a Monopolistically Competitive Wi'orld: A NonMarket-Oriented Proposal and Critique of the Market Definition--Market Share-Market Concentration Approach, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 587, 593 n. 10 (1978); see Ford Motor Co v. United States,
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litigation involving section 7 of the Clayton Act,' section 2 of the Sherman6
5
Act, 4 and other antitrust statutes. To determine the relevant product market
405 U.S. 562, 567-68, 569 (1972); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967). See
generally R. Posner, supra note 1, at 122-24.
3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 provides: "No corporation shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of one or more corporations engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition ... may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added).
4. Section 2 of the Sherman Act of 1890 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
deemed guilty of a felony ....
5.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
for use, consumption, or resale with the United States ... where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976)
(emphasis added).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of ttade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
The Antidumping Act of 1921 provides: "Whenever the Secretary of the Treasury
determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in tile
United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value, he shall so advise the United States
International Trade Commission, . . . and the Commission shall determine . . . whether an
industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being
established, by reason of the importation of such merchandise into the United States." 19 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
6. In applying the statutory language that is the basis of relevant product market analysis, the
Supreme Court has expressly stated that there is no distinction between "line of commerce" of § 7
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), and "part" of commerce of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1976). United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966); see International
Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 n.8 (1959). But cf. United States v.
American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276,-79 (1975) (distinguishing the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act from that of the Clayton Act). Courts use relevant market
standards derived from § 2 monopolization cases and § 7 merger cases interchangeably. Although
Grinnell seems to leave open the possibility of a distinction, 384 U.S. at 573, certain commentators have urged a distinction, see 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, $ 500; R. Posner,
supra note 1, at 128-29, and one court seems willing to make the distinction if adequate policy
reasons are demonstrated, L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971), the
precedent of non-distinction seems well settled. A distinction, however, may be merited solely on
the basis of statutory language. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers that "may . . .
substantially . . . lessen competition or . . . tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)
(emphasis added). Section 2 of the Sherman Act subjects those who "shall monopolize, ...
attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire ... to monopolize," to civil and criminal penalties.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (emphasis added). Because the Sherman Act deals more with realities and
the Clayton Act deals more with probabilities, the ambiguities of product market definitions
might properly be resolved in favor of the government under § 7 and for the defendant under § 2.
This Note focuses on §§ 2 and 7 and, as a matter of convenience, will make no distinction
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under traditional demand side analysis, the factfinder7 inquires whether a
buyer will substitute one product for another. 8 A less traditional approach is
potential production 9 analysis, under which the factfinder ascertains whether
a seller will substitute one manufacturing process for another.10
between them in defining the relevant product market.

Market definitions are similarly resolved in other antitrust cases. See generally Stein & Brett,
Market Definition and Market Power in Antitrust Cases-An Empirical Primer on When, Why
and How, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 639, 642-58 (1979). Relevant market analysis is an important
preliminary question in § 2 attempts to monopolize. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip-, Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965); Columbia Metal Culvert Co, v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 30 & n.37 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978);
Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1094 (1977). Contra, Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp.. 559 F.2d 488, 504 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.. 327 F.2d 459, 474-75
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). See generally Stein & Brett, supra, at 648-52;
Comment, The Relevant Market Concept in Conspiracy to Monopolize Cases Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 805 (1977). In certain circumstances, relevant market may
be pertinent in cases dealing with restraints of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1(1976). See Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20. 26-27
& n.l1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). See generally Stein & Brett, supra, at 652-56.
It may also be pertinent in cases involving exclusive dealings under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1976). Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1961). See
generally Stein & Brett, supra, at 656-58. Even the International Trade Commission, when
interpreting the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). uses similar standards to
define what constitutes an "industry." See, e.g., Water-Circulating Pumps from the U.K., 41
Fed. Reg. 22,635, 22,637-38 (1976); Certain Nonpowered Hand Tools from Japan, 40 Fed. Reg.
57,517, 57,517 (1975). See generally B. Hawk, United States, Common Market, and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide, 391 (1979).
7. Relevant product market definition is a question of fact. United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381 (1956) (Cellophane); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575
F.2d 1056, 1062 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978); Spectrofuge Corp. v Beckman
Instruments Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 276 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Sulmeyer
v. Coca Cola Co. 515 F.2d 835, 849 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1964); United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956) (Cellophane), Beatrice Foods Co. v.
FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1976); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). For
example, assume telephone companies purchase copper wire at 89j per foot. If the price rises to
99%, some firms would switch to glass cable, because both copper and glass are conductors
iapable of transmitting sound over distances. The existence of this demand substitute deters
manufacturers of copper cable from raising their price. See generally 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
supra note 1, 519a; R. Posner, supra note 1, at 125-34; F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 50-52;
L. Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 12-18. Thus, from the viewpoint of the buyer, glass and copper wire
would be within the same product market.
9. This Note uses the phrase potential production to include many types of supply side
analysis. Many other terms have been used, such as cross-elasticity of supply, production
flexibility, and supply substitution, each subject to fine distinctions, different emphases, and
overlap. See Rosenthal, Continental Can Revisited: Limits Upon the Breadth of a Line of
Commerce in a Section 7 Case, 14 Hous. L. Rev. 973, 996-1002 (1977). This Note makes no such
distinctions. Rather, "potential production" is used as a generic term to describe suppliers,
arguably not in a market, with the potential to enter that market.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U S. 495, 510-11 (1948), Kaplan
v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 293-94 (9th Cir. 1979). Telex Corp. v IBM
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Potential production analysis is not focused, as it would first seem, on
identifying the potential producers of the defendant's product." The focus is
Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 916 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 429 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub noin.
Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-3050, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979). See also R.
Posner, supra note 1, at 127-28. For example, assume the profit per worker-hour in manufacturing copper wire is 83y. If profitability rose to 91%, some steel wire manufacturers would switch to
copper wire production. Both manufacturers process.metals to produce wire. Because of tills
potential production, manufacturers of copper wire are deterred from raising their price. See
generally, 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 519b; R. Posner, supra note 1, at 125-27, 132;
F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 53-54; L. Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 12-18, 203a-b; Note, The Role of
Supply Substitutability in Defining the Relevant Product Market, 65 Va. L. Rev. 129, 131-34
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Supply Substitutability]. Thus, from the viewpoint of the supplier steel
and copper wires would be within the same relevant market. If manufacturing results in similar
products, however, supply and demand side analysis can result in the same relevant product
market. For this reason, the distinction between supply and demand substitutes is sometimes
blurred. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1964)
(Rome Cable) (Stewart J., dissenting); Brown Shoe Co v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962); Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977). For example, copper and aluminum are metals that can be
made into wire on the supply side, and used to conduct electricity on the demand side. Thus,
under both supply and demand side analysis, copper and aluminum wire would be in the same
relevant product market.
11. Generally, courts reject using the defendant's product as the relevant product. See, e.g.,
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) (Cellophane); Kaplan
v. Burroughs, Inc., 611 F.2d 286, 294-95 (9th Cir. t979); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 281-83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Telex
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 917-18 (10th Cir.). cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Nelligan v. Ford Motor Co., 262 F.2d 556, 557 (4th Cir. 1959); Packard Motor Car Co. v.
Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 822 (1957); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 428-30 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal
docketed sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-3050, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979);
L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 15. See also Bushie v. Steno'ord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 120 (9th Cir.
1972) ("Unless the manufacturer used his natural monopoly [of a product under trademark] to
gain control of the relevant market in which his products compete, the antitrust laws are not
violated."). Use of a functional definition rather than one limited to the defendant's specific
product recognizes that certain non-functional differences in products are relatively unimportant
to the consumer if the use for which the product is purchased is fulfilled. See L. Sullivan, supra
note 1, § 16. Use of potential production analysis instead of a highly specific market analysis
recognizes that producing a different good is relatively unimportant to the manufacturer if a
larger profit can be made. Cf. Crown Zellerbach, Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 812-13 (9th Cir.
1961) (a company presumably produced "what it knew it could sell"), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937
.(1962). But see, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375-76
(1927); Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971). In these cases the defendant's use of leverage led to the
definition of its product as the relevant product. Cf. Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, 553
F.2d 964, 980 (5th Cir. 1977) (relevant market of air-conditioners for Volkswagen, Porsche and
Audi), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 811
(9th Cir. 1961) (limiting the relevant product market inquiry to the products of the acquired
company), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 15 & n.15 (unique
product can be the relevant product). Furthermore, it would be disingenuous to imply that the
market definition is not sometimes tailored to fit defendants. In some instances the market
definition bears tenuous resemblance to economics and much resemblance to the defendant. See,
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on whether sufficient competitive overlap is present to warrant a broad rather

than a narrow market definition.'"

For example,

in Yoder Bros. v.

California-FloridaPlant Corp., 13 the plaintiff contended that the relevant
product market should have been limited to suppliers of chrysanthemums,
instead of the broader market of the suppliers of all ornamental plants. ' 4 This
argument was based on evidence that chrysanthemum prices are distinct from
and not sensitive to the price of other ornamental plants, and that, once
grown, a chrysanthemum is not interchangeable with other ornamental
plants. 15 The Fifth Circuit adopted potential production analysis, reasoning
that minor adjustments made production shifts by suppliers "feasible and
common,"' 16 and noting that suppliers frequently had made these adjustments
in response to demand. 7 This competitive overlap warranted a broad market
definition including all producers of ornamental plants-the potential producers of chrysanthemums. 18 The defendant's market share, therefore, was
lessened, and the monopolization claim was dismissed.' 9
Consistent with trends to probe in more depth alleged anticompetitive
effects, 20 this Note advocates more systematic analysis of potential produce.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 452-58 (1964). Beatrice Foods Co v
FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1976); General Foods Corp. v. FTC. 386 F 2d 936. 940 i3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968) (defendant asserted that relevant product market
definition was "untenable gerrymandering"). See also R. Posner, supra note 1. at 125 ("a
surprising number of innocuous mergers can be made to appear dangerously monopolisuc". The
courts' rationale for such gerrymandering in § 7 cases is the statutory language prohibiting an
anticompetitive effect in "any line of commerce." Clayton Act § 7, 15 U S C § 18 (1976)
(emphasis added). United States v. Continental Can Co.. 378 U.S. at 456-58, see United States v
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1966) (interpreting part of commerce in a § 2 monopolization case in much the same way). As colorfully put by the Grinnell dissent, a "red-haired,
bearded, one-eyed, man-with-a-limp" market, ends up looking a lot like the red-haired,
bearded, one-eyed, defendant-with-a-limp. Id. at 590-92 (Forts, J , dissenting).
12. Compare Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F 2d 1347. 1368 (5th Cir
1976) (broad market included potential producers), cert. denied, 429 U S 1094 (19771, and Telex
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 916, 919 (10th Cir.) (same), rert dismissed, 423 U S 802
(1975), with United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F 2d 296. 303-04 18th Cir 1976) (narrow
market excluded potential producers), cert. denied, 429 US 1122 (1977). and Abex Corp v
FTC, 420 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U S 865 (1970) But cf United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1945) (potential production from
foreign companies only included to the extent of actual participation in the market)
13. 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S 1094 (1977).
14. Id. at 1367.
15. Id. Sensitivity to price changes and lack of distinct prices would evidence a narrow
market. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 11962) The plaintiff also alleged
that production changes were very costly. 537 F.2d at 1367
16. 537 F.2d at 1367.
17. Id. at 1368.
18. Id. at 1367-68.
19. Id. at 1368. Yoder controlled approximately 20% of the ornamental flower market, id,
and approximately 55% of the chrysanthemum market. Id. at 1367, see note 2 supra
20. In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.. 415 U S. 486 11974). the Court urged
examination of the market's " 'structure, history and probable future"' after the presentation of
the government's statistics on anticompetitive effects. Id. at 498 (quoting Brown Shoe Co v
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962)). Previously, statistics were accepted with little

1204

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

tion. 21 An examination of the case law 22 suggests a two step approach that is

reinforced by various analogous approaches. Finally, this Note explores the
appropriateness of potential production analysis in certain instances.

discussion of rebuttal arguments. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78
(1966). See generally Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments-Class Actions,
Mergers, and Market Definition: A New Trend Toward Neutrality, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 299,
328-29 (1975); Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 92
Harv. L. Rev. 491, 500-01 (1978). In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1979), the Court rejected a per se price-fixing analysis of blanket licensing in favor of rule of
reason analysis, necessarily expanding the inquiry. The possibility that analysis might end after
proof of monopoly power has also recently been rejected. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19,
1980) (No. 79-427); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735-36 (9th
Cir. 1979). See generally Comment, Draining the Alcoa "Wishing Well": The Section 2 Conduct
Requirement After Kodak and CalComp, 48 Fordham L Rev. 291 (1979). In Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court overruled per se rules as to vertical
agreements absent a "demonstable economic effect," again expanding the analysis. Id. at 58-59.
21. Supreme Court standards for determining the relevant product market "were listed with
the intention of furnishing practical aids in identifying zones of actual or potential competition
rather than with the view that their presence or absence would dispose, in talismanic fashion, of
the [market] issue." ITT Corp. v. GTE Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 932 (9th Cir. 1975). Furthermore,
Justice Stewart, a frequent dissenter in the sixties in relevant market cases, see United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 585 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281
(1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 281 (1964) (Rome Cable), Is
using the same analysis, but is now writing for the majority. See United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 488 (1974).
22. This Note focuses on case law analysis, because this is an area of law where case law
analysis is frequently supplanted by economic analysis. Stein & Brett, supra note 5, at 640-41.
("All too often ... practitioners and the courts have become distracted by the perceived need to
address market definition and market power through the ill-suited concepts, impractical tools,
and jargon of the economist. In so doing, they fall to address the definition, analysis and proof of
such issues in the same empirical manner as is required when addressing other legal and factual
questions."); see L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 18. But cf. id. § 32 (discussing non-economic
factors inferring a monopoly). This framework is chosen only hesitantly. Usually commentators
do not think highly of the case analysis of relevant product markets. See 2 P. Areeda &
D. Turner, supra note 1,
500-36f (after 67 pages setting forth what an economic analysis of
antitrust fact patterns should be, with a mere four footnotes mentioning cases, the authors devote
only 43 pages to evaluating how case law compares); R. Posner, supra note 1, at 130 ("I shall not
burden the reader with a detailed examination of the many aberrant market-definition cases since
Brown Shoe."); L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 12 (the introduction to relevant market In
monopolization cases contains references to 6 economic analyses and not a single case), § 203
(market definitions in merger cases have been "monstrosities'). See also Markovits, supra note 2,
at 590-91 (wholly rejecting the concept of relevant market). The possibility that antitrust law Is
needlessly complicated by an ambiguous science only begins to justify dismissal of this analysis.
Furthermore, opinions dealing with antitrust law are not easily reconciliable. United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954). Still "the market's boundaries ultimately reflect a legal conclusion, not an economic fact."
2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 518 (footnote omitted). Judges, not economists, decide
antitrust law. Case analysis, therefore, is the proper starting point.
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POTENTIAL PRODUCTION IN THE COURTS

A.

Supreme Court Precedent
In early cases, the Supreme Court included mere hypothetical potential
production in the relevant market 2 3 Although the Court has never expressly
rejected this approach, it has not expanded a market with potential producers
in over thirty years. The only application of potential production analysis in
that time was a rejection on the facts in a footnote.2 4 Although dissenting
justices have favored this approach,2 5 majority opinions2 in
cases where this
6
analysis would have been appropriate have ignored it.
In United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,2 7 an early case utilizing potential

production analysis, the government challenged a merger under sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act.2" Defendant Consolidated Steel had purchased rolled
steel plates and shapes on the open market before merging with defendant
United States Steel, and from U.S. Steel after the merger. 2 9 The government
alleged that the foreclosure of Consolidated from purchasing steel plates and
shapes on the open market was anticompetitive. 30 Although the government
23. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1948); see United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 438 (2d Cir. 1945). For other discussions of Supreme
Court precedent in this context see 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1,
536; Supply
Substitutability, supra note 10, at 137-38.
24. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962).
25. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 283-85 (1964) (Rome Cable)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 366-67 (1962) (Harlan,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
26. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome Cable); 2
P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, T 535 c, n.18; R. Posner, supra note 1, at 130.
27. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
28. Id. at 498; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). For the text of these sections, see notes 3, 4 supra. It
is important to note that the standards under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are more tolerant
with regard to mergers than those of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). For the text of
§ 7, see note 2 supra. This is evident in the legislative history of the 1950 amendment of § 7.
Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 899, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)). See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 314-23
(1962). This stricter standard is obvious because almost all mergers are challenged under § 7, not
§§ 1 or 2. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 271 (1966); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 443 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 296 (1962); cf. United States v. American Bldg. Aalntenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275,
285-86 (1975) (no § 1 arguments were forwarded to invalidate a merger when § 7 was deemed
inapplicable). See generally L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 202b. The stricter standard of § 7 is
largely irrelevant to product market questions raised here because this Note focuses on the
standards for determining the relevant market under §§ 2 and 7, which are very similar. See
Supply Substitutability, supra note 10, at 138-39; note 6 supra. To the extent that the Court's
holding in Columbia Steel is based on § 1, however, relevant product market definitions dealt
with in this Note-under §§ 2 and 7-and under § 1 may be distinguishable. See Columbia Metal
Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 27 n.II (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 876 (1978).
29. 334 U.S. at 508.
30. Id. at 507.
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contended that the relevant product market should include only rolled steel
plates and shapes, 3' the Court accepted defendants' argument that producers
of plates and shapes could manufacture other items of rolled steel. If these
rolled steel products could easily be made, all rolled steel producers would be3
within the relevant market. 32 No evidence of actual production flexibility"
had been offered; 3 4 mere potential was considered sufficient. 35 Thus, the
Columbia Steel Court held that even if the end products from rolled steel were
used by buyers in different ways and were not interchangeable once produced, the relevant market should include all manufacturers of rolled steel
with the potential to produce rolled steel plates and shapes.3 6 Similarly, in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),37 the government alleged
that Alcoa, as the sole manufacturer of aluminum cable, possessed monopoly
power in that market. 38 The court, however, reasoned that because of the
ease of substituting copper for aluminum in production, 39 the market could
not be limited to the manufacturers
of aluminum cable but must include the
40
producers of copper cable.

The Supreme Court has not expanded a relevant market with potential
producers since Alcoa and Columbia Steel. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 4' the Court set forth a two-part test in relevant market analysis: first,
define the outer boundaries of a product market, 4 2 and second, determine
whether well-defined submarkets exist. 43 Under this test evidence establishing

31. Id. at 510-11.
32. Id.
33. Production flexibility is the ability to respond to market forces by changing what is
produced. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, T 526a; note 9 supra.
34. 334 U.S. at 510-11.
35. See id. at 510. A broader market including all manufacturers of rolled steel products
would have been appropriate if those in the broader market could have produced, as opposed to
did produce, plates and shapes. Id.
36. Id. at 511.
37. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). Alcoa is not a Supreme Court case but is treated as
such. Three judges from the Second Circuit made up the court of last resort because a quorum of
the Supreme Court was lacking. Id. at 421. See generally American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 811-12 & n.10 (1946). The Supreme Court has expressly approved tile legal
doctrines set forth in Alcoa. Id. at 811-13. Although the statements in Alcoa concerning relevant
market are not expressly endorsed, see id. at 813-14, approval can be inferred from the "unique
circumstances which add to (Alcoa's] weight as a precedent." Id. at 811. For an economic analysis
of Alcoa, see 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1,
530.
38. 148 F.2d at 438.
39. See id. Furthermore, Alcoa's market power was greater because buyer preference,
perhaps unreasonably, mandated the use of virgin ingot in the production of wire. Id. at 423,
Alcoa produced 90% of the virgin ingot and only 60% of all aluminum ingot. Id. at 424
40. See id. at 433.
41. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
42. Id. at 325.
43. "The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical
indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers,
distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specializec vendors." Id. (footnote omitted). This
Note does not distinguish market analysis from submarket analysis because the criteria used to
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potential production would require that potential manufacturers be included
in the broad market." In Brown Shoe, however, the Court found a narrow
market appropriate because manufacturers "generally" did not change production capabilities to meet demand. 4 Justice Harlan concurred on the
define markets and submarkets are much the same. R. Posner, supra note 1. at 129-30, Stein &
Brett, supra note 6, at 642 n.10. Both measure the extent to which a group of products is
effectively shielded from competition. See note 1 supra. The distinction seems to be that courts
defining a narrow market use "submarket" analysis, see, e.g., Avnet, Inc v FTC, 511 F 2d 70,
77-78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975); Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F 2d 928, 930-32 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); CBS, Inc. v. FTC, 414 F.2d 974, 978-79(7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F 2d 936, 940-43 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968), while courts defining a broad market use "market"
analysis. See, e.g., Fount-Wip, Inc. v. Reddi-Wip. Inc., 568 F.2d 1296. 1301-02 (9th Cir 1978),
Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F 2d 1347, 1366-68 (5th Cir. 1976). cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (i0th Cir ), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Acme Precision Prods., Inc, v American Alloys Corp., 484 F 2d
1237, 1240-44 (8th Cir. 1973). But see Columbia Metal Culvert Co v Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 26-30 (3d Cir.) ("market" analysis to define a narrow market), -ertdenied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1062-65 (3d
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc,
575 F.2d 256, 276-86 (5th Cir. 1978) ("submarket" analysis to define a broad market), cert
denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); George R. Whitten, Jr.. Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc , 508
F.2d 547, 550-54 (1st Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) To the extent that
potential production analysis is inconsistent with a narrow market, it is inconsistent with
submarket analysis. The two concepts can be harmonized, however, although the cases do not
probe this deeply. Because limitations on potential production analysis can protect against
unbridled expansion of the market, it is contended supply side factors should be analyzed, not
ignored, even within a narrow market. Accord, Supply Substitutability,supra note 10, at 140-41.
The distinction between market and submarket analysis may also be significant in determining
how much weight to give potential production analysis. One indication of a submarket, "unique
production facilities," 370 U.S. at 325, can be confused with potential production to the extent
that uniqueness implies a lack of potential producers. See, e.g., Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d
928, 931-32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); General Foods Corp. v.FTC, 386 F.2d
936, 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v.M.P.M., Inc. 397
F. Supp. 78, 86-87 (D. Colo. 1975); Stein & Brett, supra note 6. at 665-66. See generally Supply
Substitutability, supra note 10, at 141 n.70. When courts consider potential production as but one
of seven factors to be weighed in defining the market, supply side factors are improperly diluted.
Id. at 141. Other commentators largely agree that potential production is important enough to
consider independently, regardless of the breadth of the market. See 2 P Areeda & D. Turner,
supra note 1, ' 535-36 (same weight given to production substitutes and demand substitutes),
R. Posner, supra note 1, at 132 (omission of potential production analysis in merger guidelines is
"glaring"); F. Scherer, supra note 1. at 53-54 (giving supply substitutes the same weight as
demand substitutes); L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 16 (mostly focusing on demand substitutes as
does the case law). But see Stein & Brett, supra note 6, at 665-66 & n 154 (confusing market with
submarket analysis, and arguing that the commentators are divided and unclear)
44. 370 U.S. at 325, n.42. Footnote 42 only discusses vertical mergers. When the Court
discussed the product market for the horizontal aspects of the merger, however, itconcluded that
the analysis is the same. Id. at 336. Indeed, these relevant market standards are applicable in
many other antitrust cases. See note 6 supra.
45. Id. The narrow market was supported by a finding of distinct customers and peculiar
characteristics and uses of the product. Id. at 326. Here, the defendant had advocated a narrow
market. See Brief for Appellant, at 125-27, Brown Shoe Co- v. United States, 370 U-S 294
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merits, dissented on jurisdiction, and disagreed with the findings of fact. 46
Specifically, he argued that because production could be shifted "without
undue difficulty," potential producers should have expanded the relevant
product market. 47 He contended that potential production analysis would
have been a more "realistic gauge of the possible anticompetitive effects." ' 48
The nadir of potential production analysis occurred in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable). 49 Although the facts of Rome Cable
were similar to those in Alcoa,5 0 the Court found that the market of insulated
aluminum cable was distinct from that of insulated copper cable. 5 1 Potential
production was never specifically mentioned in the majority opinion, 5 2 but it
was conceded that aluminum and copper cable were somewhat interchangeable. 5 3 The Court, however, divided aluminum and copper cable into separate markets because of the difference in selling price and the distinct uses of
the two types of cable. 5 4 The finding of separate markets was not uncontested. Justice Stewart, writing for the dissent, would have included copper
wire manufacturers in the relevant market. 5- He noted that "[t]he federal trial
courts were admonished to examine [the] 'practical indicia' [of Brown Shoe
which] express in practical terms the basic economic concept that markets are
to be defined in terms of close substitutability of either product (demand) or
production facilities (supply), since it is ultimately the degree of substitutabil(1962), reprinted in 9 Antitrust Law: Major Briefs and Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of
the United States (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1979), at 474-76 (hereinafter cited as Major
Briefs].
46. 370 U.S. at 357 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Because the
relevant product market is a question of fact, see note 7 supra, most disagreements on this issue
do not center on law, but on fact. Thus, on this question, a dissenting opinion can be an accurate
statement of the law. See, SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
47. 370 U.S. at 366-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
48. Id. at 367.
49. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
50. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text. The same market of cable manufacturers
was at issue. Alcoa, however, was discussed in neither the opinion nor the briefs. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome Cable); Briefs for Appellant and
Appellees, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome Cable),
reprinted in 15 Major Briefs, supra note 45.
51. 377 U.S. at 275-76.
52. See 377 U.S. at 284-85 (Stewart, J., dissenting). This was despite the district court's
finding of actual production flexibility and appellees' argument for it in their briefs. Id. at 285;
Brief for Appellees at 34-38, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964)
(Rome Cable), reprinted in 15 Major Briefs, supra note 45, at 189-93.
53. 377 U.S. at 275-77. The Court based this finding on demand side analysis. Id.
54. Id. at 276-77. The stated rationale for finding that slight interchangeability was Insufficient was submarket analysis. The market/submarket distinction confuses the analysis,
however, and is avoided here. See note 43 supra.
55. 377 U.S. at 285 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent disputed the finding that different
prices and uses were significant enough to merit separate markets. Id. at 284-86. Interestingly
enough, the government had conceded in the court below that insulated copper and aluminum
wire were within the same market. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501,
509, 510 (N.D.N.Y. 1963) (item 7), rev'd, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome Cable).
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ity that limits the exercise of market power. ''S 6 By applying this standard he
concluded that "complete manufacturing interchangeability" existed in theory
and practice S 7 The Supreme Court's reluctance to analyze potential production, coupled with potential production's clear competitive effect,"8 has left
lower courts without guidelines on this issue.
B.

Context and Approachfor PotentialProductionAnalysis

The scarcity of potential production analysis is part of a traditional judicial
focus on demand factors when resolving relevant market questions. In that
tradition, the Supreme Court has defined the relevant product as those
"commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes." 9 Furthermore, Brown Shoe 60indicia for defining product markets
focus heavily on buyers' perceptions.
The lower federal courts have perpetuated and refined this demand side
focus. 61 In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 the district court
observed thal relevant market analysis "which ignores the buyers and focuses
63
on what the sellers do, or theoretically can do, is not meaningful.1
Bethlehem Steel was the first of many cases to hold that although perceptions
of manufacturers may be important, the perceptions of consumers "are most
salient in the determination of market boundaries." 64 This approach has
56. 377 U.S. at 283 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
57. Id. at 285 (Stewart, J.,dissenting). This presumably met the "general" trend standard
required in Brown Shoe. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 10, 44 supra and accompanying text.
59. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) (Cellophane).
60. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); see note 43 supra and accompanying text. Of the seven indicia,
four are clearly focused on the demand side: distinct customers; sensitivity to price changes;
distinct prices; and peculiar characteristics and uses. Two clearly focus on the supply side: unique
production facilities; and specialized vendors. Recognition of the market is either industrial
recognition (supply) or public recognition (demand). Thus four of the factors focus on demand,
two focus on supply, and one recognizes both. Accord, Supply Substitutability, supra note 10, at
141 n.70. But see Stein & Brett, supra note 6, at 663-68 (dividing the Brown Shoe factors into
nine categories, with only five of nine focusing on demand side analysis).
61. See, e.g., Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v. National Educ. Advertising Serv., Inc., 516
F.2d 1092, 1098 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975); George RL Whitten, Jr., Inc. v.
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 553 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975); CBS, Inc. v. FTC, 414 F.2d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
62. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Bethlehem Steel at least implicitly recognized
potential production. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1,
536b.
63. Id. at 592. In explaining why the peculiar uses and characteristics test of Cellophane was
to be preferred over the production flexibility test of Columbia Steel, the court reasoned that the
buyer's freedom of product choice is what § 7 was intended to protect. Id. at 592 n.34. Rather
than balancing these two factors, the court distinguished Columbia Steel as a § 1 analysis of
mergers, which is inappropriate in a § 7 case. Id. The distinction between an analysis of a merger
under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act is probably still valid. See note 28 supra.
This distinction between § 1 and § 7 in the context of relevant market definitions may also still be
valid. See note 28 supra.
64. Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 30 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); see United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, Inc.,
361 F. Supp. 983, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Occasionally, supply side analysis is summarily
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resulted in a general neglect of potential production analysis; even when
courts explore6 supply side factors, it is almost as an afterthought of demand
side analysis.

-

Overreliance on the perceptions of buyers, however, can distort the relevant product market definition. Two vastly different products in terms of
manufacture, if perceived by consumers to have the same use, can be found to
be within the same market. 66 Furthermore, some courts focus solely on
demand side analysis even when supply side analysis is patently more
appropriate. For example, identical products have been found to be in
separate markets when the perceptions and purchasing habits of buyers
differed. 67 Similarly, a price difference has supported an inference of different
buyer perceptions, which, in turn, supported separate markets.68 Thus, even
in the absence of evidence distinguishing two seemingly identical goods,
courts have found separate markets. These anomalies will continue until
potential production is analyzed more closely.
Despite the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the persistent
focus on demand side factors, 69 lower courts have expanded, with some
reservations, relevant markets to include potential producers. Various cases
suggest that the first step of potential production analysis is to explore the
ability of producers to enter the relevant product market. In traditional
antitrust terms, the courts explore the ability of the supplier to overcome

dismissed on this basis. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTrC, 540 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1976);
George F. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 551 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971).
65. See SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 838 (1978); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 303 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d
1264, 1273 (9th Cir. 1975). This bias is so deep that when the Twin City court found supply side
analysis appropriate it distinguished five Supreme Court cases. 512 F.2d at 1273-74. The
Supreme Court cases distinguished were: International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S.
242 (1959); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (GM), United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131 (1948); and Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
66. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 553 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co,,
351 U.S. 377, 399-400 (1956) (Cellophane).
67. CBS, Inc. v. FTC, 414 F.2d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
That the products were identical was unquestioned. The issue was whether the record market
could be divided into the record club and retail distribution markets. Id. But see ITT Corp. v.
GTE Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 933 (9th Cir. 1975) (a manufacturer is not concerned with the identity
of the buyer).
68. CBS, Inc. v. FTC, 414 F.2d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the manufacture of florist
foil was held to be the relevant product market even though florist foil did not differ from other
decorative foils in terms of strength, gauge, or composition The Reynolds court also used price
differences to support its findings. Id.; cf. Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70, 78 n.22 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975) (sales of rebuilt parts distinguished from sales of original
equipment on the basis of substantial price differentials).
69. See notes 23-68 supra and accompanying text.
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barriers to entry. 70 These barriers, in effect, measure the potential of a firm to
be a producer in the relevant market. 7 1 Various barriers to entry are sufficient to warrant exclusion of potential producers from the relevant prod73
72
uct market. The need for complementary products, increased transport costs,

70.

Barriers to entry traditionally have been used to evaluate the meaning of the market share

of the defendant. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U S 495. 528 (19481 ("The

relative effect of percentage command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor is
placed."). The examples of barriers to entry are many. See, e.g., United States v Standard Oil
Co., 362 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (long-term requirements contracts foreclose
competition), aff'd ment., 412 U.S. 924 (1973); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc v
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (reserve clause precluded
players from joining competing league); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp . 110 F Supp,
295, 343-45 (D. Mass. 1953) (lease only system excluded "actual and potential competition'). aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See generally F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 216-19. 226-33.
275-77; L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 23; Supply Substitutability, supra note 10. at 133. Barriers to
entry is used here as shorthand for what the Court has referred to as "feasibilty of
manufacture" of the relevant product. Brown Shoe Co. v.United States, 370 U S 294. 325 n-42
(1962). In the context of potential production analysis various inabilities can limit the potential to
enter. A lack of capability to distribute a product is such a limitation. See Avnet. Inc v FTC.
511 F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975). In Spectrofuge Corp v Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U S. 939 (1979). the "lack of
service capability," was not overcome by hiring and training new employees Id at 281, 284
Because this barrier only affected the plaintiff and not the market as a whole, however. it did not
place limits on the relevant market. See id. at 284. The fact that other companies are in the same
market when one company possesses significant cost advantages flowing from location ur access
to supplies, however, may evidence a noncompetitive market. See 2 P Areeda & D Turner.
supra note 1, 510; R. Posner, supra note 1, at 128; L. Sullivan, supra note 1. § 12, at 41-42
This must be distinguished from the cost advantages resulting from efficiencies in size, management, and labor, which are legal barriers to entry. Berkey Photo. Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co.
603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W 3517 (U S Feb 19. 19801 iNo
79-427); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295. 344-45 t) Mass 19531.
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See generally, 2 P. Areeda & D Turner. supra note 1. C
510; L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 12, at 4142.
71. Expansion of the relevant market with potential producers is limited by the functional
interchangeability of the products or services that can be provided. Twin City Sportservice. Inc
v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 1975). As production gets more
speculative, i.e. where it involves a potential producer of a functionally interchangeable product
in a nearby geographic market, inclusion of potential producers in the market becomes more
tenuous and likely to offend a court's sense of actuality. See notes 82-85 infra and accompanying
test; cf. Markovits, supra note 2, at 590-91 (arguing that these complexities make relevant market
analysis untenable).
72. ITT Corp. v. GTE Corp. 518 F.2d 913, 933 (9th Cir. 19751 The ITT court held that
those companies which overcame these barriers--specifically, the cost of interface devices
necessary to compete with telephone-operating companies--and entered the market should be
considered part of the market. Id.; accord, United States v. Aluminum Co.of America. 148 F 2d
416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). In both cases inclusion in the relevant market was limited to the
level of actual competition. 518 F.2d at 933, 148 F.2d at 425-26. But cf note 15 supra and
accompanying text (scope of relevant product market is resolved to include all or none of the
potential production).
73. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F 2d 416, 426 27 (2d Cir 19451
(Alcoa). This is a geographic barrier to entry. See P. Areeda & D Turner, supra note 1.c 522
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excessive start-up costs, 7 4 or even government tariffs 7" can limit entry
of a potential producer. Other barriers, such as a time lag in beginning
production 7 6 or lack of trained personnel,

77

can also limit entry.

When substantial barriers to entry set off a group of manufacturers from
alleged potential producers, 7 8 a narrow market that excludes potential pro-

ducers is appropriate. 79 Absence of barriers to entry or increased potential of

manufacturers to change production from one good to another should support

a broad market.80 Courts, therefore, should inquire whether entry potential
8
exists as a practical matter; if it does further analysis is appropriate.

The second step of potential production analysis should be to determine
whether actual production, supporting the finding of potential to enter, is
present. For example, in Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 82 the government
conceded that others could easily manufacture the relevant product.8 3 Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Circuit excluded potential producers from
the relevant market because this potential production did not occur. 84 Mere
hypothetical potential production is not sufficient. 85
74. United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 303-04 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977) (potential use of natural gas or electricity to replace liquified petroleum was
limited by the costs of constructing pipelines and converting equipment to fit the new source of
energy). But see Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 293-95 (9th Cir. 1979) (in a highly
differentiated product market, the entry barrier is what itcosts to produce one, not all, of the
highly differentiated products). See generally Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 915-17
(10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
75. ITT Corp. v. GTE Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1975).
76. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa); see
2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, T 519b.
77. Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 284 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
78. See note 1 supra.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 303-04 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); ITT Corp. v. GTE Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945).
80. See, e.g., Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 284-85 (Sth
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537
F.2d 1347, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); Telex Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 919 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
81. The standard "as a practical matter" would make barriers to entry a threshold inquiry.
Analysis should continue if entry by potential producers is a possibility. Potential, of course, Is a
matter of degree. It is clear, however, that a lack of barriers is a prerequisite to the inclusion of
potential producers in the relevant market. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, T 518
(potential market power is a matter of degree which varies with the barriers to entry);
L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 23, at 79 (evaluation of barrier to entry is essentially an act of
judgment); Supply Substitutability, supra note 10, at 133 (lack of barriers to entry should lead to
a market including supply substitutes); note 70 supra (significant barriers may evidence a
noncompetitive market even when entry has been achieved).
82. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
83. Id. at 225.
84. Id. at 225, 228-29. The constancy of the specialized production in terms of number and
identity of manufacturers involved, was one reason cited for giving potential production little
weight. Id. at 229. The hypothetical potential of the defendant to produce another variation of a
product as the basis for expanding the relevant market has also been rejected. Crown Zellerbach
Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
85. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (florist foil

1980]

POTENTIAL PRODUCTION

1213

Requiring actuality of production results from the courts' emphasis on
discovering "patterns of trade which are followed in practice." 86 Pursuant to
this reasoning, courts should "deal with the economic realities of competition
as they exist and not on the speculative basis of what they could be. The fact
is that [manufacturers] do not do whatever it is they can do."8 7 Thus, patterns
and customs in the market should be of primary importance. For example, in
L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC,88 the Seventh Circuit expanded the market by
including potential producers in one context but refused to do so in another,
implicitly distinguishing the potential producers on the basis of actuality.8 9 In
Balfour, the FTC had found a relevant market comprised of "national college
fraternity jewelry" manufacturers. 90 On appeal, the defendants first argued
that each fraternity should be considered a separate market 9 because once
jewelry was produced, the manufacturer could only sell it to a member of the
specific fraternity. 92 The court acknowledged that rings could not be substituted for one another once produced, but suggested that focusing solely on
demand side analysis was inappropriate. Implicitly applying potential proproducers were constant in identity and number over a period of years); United States v. Pennzoil
Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 975 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (although many others could refine Penn Grade
crude, the actual refiners had remained the same for fifteen years); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (steel producers focused on specific
product lines). But see notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text (mere hypothetical potential
seems to have been enough). Established patterns of trade may be accompanied by substantial
barriers to entry. See notes 70-81 supra and accompanying text. Proof of these barriers. however,
does not appear to be necessary to exclude mere hypothetical production from the relevant
market. See 309 F.2d at 225; 252 F. Supp. at 975; 168 F. Supp. at 592.
86. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296. 303 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
87. United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 975 (W.D. Pa. 1965). Even in the Ninth
Circuit, where actuality is accorded less emphasis, a showing of actual production flexibility is
desirable. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 429 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
appeal docketed sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-3050. 78-3236 (9th Cir.
Aug. 1, 1979).
88. 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
89. For the sake of analysis, this Note ignores the possibility that the government's prima
facie case to show lessened competition, Horizontal Mergers After U.S. v. General Dynamics
Corp., 92 Harv. L. Rev. 491, 495-99 (1978), was analogous to the government's burden of proof
in market definition cases. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 9. The FTC's market definition
may have constituted a prima facie market definition, and the defendant in Balfour may simply
have failed in two separate instances to rebut the government's prima facie case. The deference
afforded the government's case is obvious. In front of the Supreme Court the only even nominal
government loss in substantive § 7 analysis until 1972 was United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), where the government's case was not sustained factually on remand.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, 389 U.S. 308 (1967); see United States v. Von's Grocery Co.. 384 U.S.
270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J. dissenting) ("The sole consistency... in litigation under § 7, [is that)
the Government always wins."); F. Scherer, supra note 1. at 482-83; L. Sullivan, supra note 1,
§ 202 n.5.
90. L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1971).
91. Petitioners probably iought a narrow market definition here in an attempt to limit the
scope of the remedy. See note 2 supra.
92. 442 F.2d at 10. A member of Sigma Alpha Mu will not buy a ring marked Pi Alpha
Delta, no matter how low the price. See id.
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duction analysis, 93 the court reasoned that failure to include all fraternity
emblematic rings in the same market "would deny the realities of the market
situation. '94 The defendants also contended that the market should include all
manufacturers of emblematic jewelry-the potential producers of fraternity
jewelry. 95 The court summarily dismissed this argument, reasoning that
Bethlehem Steel and its progeny dictated the application of demand side
analysis alone. 9 6 The court did not discuss the characteristics of the potential
producers, except to suggest that the production involved was merely
hypothetical. 97 The implicit difference in rejecting markets of individual
fraternities and of all emblematic jewelry manufacturers is that the defendant
had the potential to and did change production procedures to sell to the
various fraternities, whereas other manufacturers of emblematic jewelry did
not in fact produce emblematic jewelry for fraternities. 98
The actuality requirement appears to be well established. 99 The level of
competitive overlap needed to include potential producers in the relevant
product market, however, is unclear, although courts have suggested various
standards. In Brown Shoe, 100 for example, the Court found that potential
producers would be included in the relevant market if there were a "general"
trend in the industry of changing production capabilities to meet demand. '0 '
In a more recent case, the Fifth Circuit queried whether production shifts
were "common and feasible.' 0 2 Other courts have suggested that potential
production must exist "as a practical matter.' 0 3 Applying this standard in
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 104 the Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff was
93. Presumably, production capabilities were changed to create the various rings, and thus
the rings exemplified supply substitutes. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
94. 442 F.2d at 11.
95. Id.
96. Id. Read narrowly, these cases reject only mere hypothetical potential production. Most
of these cases explicitly analyze supply side factors. See notes-62-64 supra and accompanying text.
97. Petitioners argued that college fraternities "could, if necessary," turn to other manufacturers of emblematic jewelry. 442 F.2d at 11 (emphasis added). This implies that college fraternities
did not, in fact, turn to these other suppliers.
98. This conclusion flows from the semantic distinction between "could, if necessary," see
note 97 supra, and "market realities." See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text. For an
argument similar to that in Balfour, see United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361
F. Supp. 983, 990-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the court held that the most flashy band uniforms
were viable alternatives for anyone seeking band uniforms. Manufacturers of other made-tomeasure uniforms, for theater ushers, firefighters, or police, were excluded. The actual production flexibility distinction is at best an implicit one in that the court rejected defendant's argument
by focusing on the distinctiveness of the buyers of band uniforms. Id. at 991.
99. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
100. 370 U.S. at 294 (1962).
101. Id. at 325 n.42; see notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
102. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1367 (Sth Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S 1094 (1977); see notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
103. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 916 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975); Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970).
Because this is a question of fact, see note 7 supra, any of these standards is amenable to varying
interpretations.
104. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
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an actual potential producer because it had advocated internal production
changes, offered to shift manufacturing for its customers, and actually
changed production to meet demand.' 05 The actuality requirement has also
been restated as including only "serious" competition. In United States v.
Empire Gas Corp.,106 the Eighth Circuit found various interchangeable
products within the relevant market, 0 7 but, because the suppliers were not
yet "serious competitors," the court excluded them from the relevant market. 108

The Fifth Circuit recently analyzed actuality in an interesting way. In
Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, 109 the court probed whether manufacturers focused "[w]ith few exceptions," on a particular product.' " The
court suggested that actual overlap could be proven by the behavior of either
those within the alleged narrow market, or those outside the narrow market
but within the alleged broad market. II Applying this standard the court found
that no "outside" manufacturers produced the relevant product-no potential
producers had actually entered the market" 12-and that the producers in the
market did not manufacture products in the alleged broader market, although
they had the potential to do so."1 3 Because the products of "outside" and
"inside" manufacturers did not overlap, the court upheld the narrow market
definition. 114 The approach taken by the Fifth Circuit is laudable because it
scrutinizes competitive effects that originate both in the narrow and broad
market.
The actuality requirement measures the production history of the potential
producers." 5 To reflect trade realities adequately, more than mere hypothetical potential production should be required."16 Although the standards to
determine the requisite level of production overlap are similar," 7 "as a
practical matter" is the preferable standard because, through its application,
an acknowledged competitive effect is included in the relevant market."18
105. Id. at 917.
106. 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S 1122 (1977).
107. Id. at 303.
108. Id. at 304. Another interpretation of this holding is that a substantial time lag before
entry by potential producers is possible excludes them from the relevant market- See note 76
supra and accompanying text.
109. 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 US_ 1087 (1978).
110. Id. at 980.
111. See id.
112. Id. This was based on the finding that of the four major competitors in the market, two
never sold outside the proposed market, one had other sales that were insignificant, and one, alter
having outside sales of 10%, focused at the time of the lawsuit almost exclusively on the proposed
market. Id.
113. Id.; see note 85 supra and accompanying text.
114. 553 F.2d at 980.
115. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
116. A competitive effect from an actual potential producer might exist, however, without
that potential producer being in the market. Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co , 376
U.S. 651, 658-59 (1964) (a company can be a substantial factor in a market without technically
being in the market).
117. See notes 100-14 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, to the extent that inclusion

1216

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Furthermore, because potential production questions usually scrutinize the
overlap of production capabilities,' 1 9 actuality analysis should explore the
production of all manufacturers within the alleged broad market. This
includes the acts of those within the alleged narrow market, and those only
within the alleged broad market.' 20 Within this framework, supply side
factors would be explored because of the recognized competitive effect, 121 and
would be limited to reflect trade realities. 122
I.

ANALOGOUS CONCEPTS

Although the Supreme Court has neglected potential production analysis,
lower federal courts have accepted it with appropriate limitations. Furthermore, other legal analyses presently used by courts explore the effects that
suppliers have on a market. These analyses and their various limitations
further reinforce a qualified acceptance of potential production analysis. 12 3
A.

Capacity

Some courts use capacity rather than sales/production figures to determine a
firm's market share. 12 4 Sales/production figures take into account only actual
transactions. 125 When capacity is used, however, a court measures the extent
of potential producers in the relevant market evidences a willingness to analyze the concept in
depth, "as a practical matter" is preferable. See notes 104-05 supra and accompanying text.
"Common and feasible." a "general" trend, "with few exceptions," and "serious competitors" seem
to allow a competitive effect to be present without including that effect in the market. See notes
100-02, 106-14 supra and accompanying. text.
119. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 109-14 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
123. For a similar discussion advocating total acceptance of the doctrine, see Supply Substitutability, supra note 10, at 134-36.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278 (1964) (Rome
Cable); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 503, 505 (1948); Reynolds Metals Co.
v FTC, 309 F.2d 223. 225 (D.C. Cir. 1962). One court discussed sales versus capacity as a
measure and concluded that "[u]sing capacity as the measure of market position enables one to
obtain a picture of the structure of the industry, unclouded by current manipulations which may
be practiced by those who operate within the market." United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F.Supp.
956, 962 (D. Conn. 1975). Production or sales, however, is the most frequent measure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 297 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 379
(1956) (Cellophane). See generally 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 1 520. In some
Supreme Court cases, capacity and production figures are used interchangeably without express
distinction. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278 (1964) (Rome
Cable); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 505, 509 (1948). Capacity, as a
measure of market power, can work for or against the defendant, depending on whether the
percentage of the defendant's market share of capacity exceeds that of actual production. If a
defendant's capacity is proportionately greater than that of its competitors, a capacity measure
will work to the defendant's detriment; if it is proportionately less, a capacity measure will work
to the defendant's benefit. Cf. note 2 supra and accompanying text (including potential production in the relevant product market can work for or against the defendant),
125. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 567 (1966); United States v.
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 248 (1955) (appendix); 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra
note 1,
520.
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to which companies in the market could produce. 126 Capacity essentially
measures the potential of a firm to produce a certain good. 127 Potential
production essentially measures the potential of all companies to produce a
certain good.1 28 The potential of a firm already in the market to increase
production (capacity), and the potential of other firms to begin or resume
production (potential production), are similar and are similarly limited.' 2 9
The firms whose potential is measured with capacity figures are already
actually producing, and thus the actuality requirement is fulfilled.' 30 Because
of the business inefficiencies usually associated with the maintenance of excess
capacity, capacity does not always reflect market power.13 ' Similarly, mere
hypothetical
potential production is rejected as a distortion of trade real32
ities. 1

B.

Captive Sales

The second analogous situation is that courts include captive sales, those
33
sales made within the company itself, in the relevant product market.1
Because captive sales are not directly subject to the forces of the competitive
market, they constitute potential production. Hypothetically, if there are
changes in demand, a company will divert captive sales to the competitive
market.1 34 Courts have implicitly recognized this potential diversion as a
competitive effect when they have included captive sales in the relevant
market. 3 5 A market including captive sales, those product transactions
126. United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956, 961-62 (D. Conn. 1975); 2 P. Areeda &
D. Turner, supra note 1,
520 n.1.
127. This potential is the amount the firm is capable of producing (capacity) less that which is
actually produced (saleslproduction). See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
520.
129. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1,
130. For a discussion of the actuality requirement as it relates to potential production, see
notes 82-122 supra and accompanying text.
131. The difficulty of accurately measuring capacity is another reason for its limited use. See
2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 520. Similarly, mere hypothetical potential production
may be rejected because of uncertainty of measure. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566 (1972); Sulmeyer v. Coca
Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 850 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). See generally 2 P. Areeda &
527e, 527f; see also R Posner, supra note 1, at 196. Inclusion of
D. Turner, supra note 1,
captive sales in the relevant market can work for or against the defendant. Cf. note 2 supra
(including potential producers in the relevant market can work for or against the defendant). In
Ford Motor, the inclusion of the captive sales of another manufacturer, General Motors,
decreased Ford's market share. 405 U.S. at 566. In Sulmeyer, manufacturers other than the
defendant had franchises--captive suppliers-that decreased the defendant's market share. 515
F.2d at 850. In Alcoa, however, the inclusion of the defendant's captive sales increased Alcoa's
share of the market. 148 F.2d at 424.
134. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 527f & n.13. These authorities list other
competitive effects that captive sales have on the competitive market. The major factor is that
control over captive sales represents control over supply. Id. In this sense, captive sales are
related to capacity. See notes 124-32 supra and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., ITT Corp. v. GTE Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 931 (9th Cir. 1975); Sulmeyer v.
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between a parent and a subsidiary, is well accepted. 136 In Alcoa, 137 for
example, the court included captive sales in the market because the defendant's internal sales "necessarily had a direct effect upon the . . . market"

even without being a part of the competitive market. 38 Thus, including
captive sales in the relevant product market is directly analogous to potential
production because both analyses recognize the competitive effect of goods not
presently sold in the competitive market, and include that effect in the
relevant product market.' 39 Furthermore, as with potential production, inclusion of captive sales in the relevant market is limited. Captive sales analysis
thus, excluding mere potential sales to affiliates has been
requires actuality;' 40
4
held appropriate. ' '

C. Potential Competition
There is also a striking similarity between potential production and potential competition, a section 7 theory used to invalidate mergers. The potential
competition theory asserts that a firm technically outside a market may have a
competitive effect in that market.' 42 When this firm merges with a company in
the market the elimination of that competitive effect may be deemed illegal. ' 43 Both potential production and potential competition attempt to measure
Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 850 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). This is appropriate
because the captive buyer will almost always sell the end product to the consumer. See 148 F.2d
at 424; F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 239.
136. In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566 (1972), the Court found that
Ford had foreclosed 15% of the sparkplug market by purchasing a sparkplug manufacturer.
General Motors already owned and purchased sparkplugs from AC, and AC's production,
although captive, was included in the relevant market. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 301 (1962) (inclusion of sales to wholly-owned subsidiaries in the relevant product
market); ITT Corp. v. GTE Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 931 (9th Cir. 1975) (not even a consent decree
shielding the anticompetitive effects of vertical integration from governmental attack merits the
exclusion of captive sales from the relevant market in a private antitrust action). In strict
competitive terms, however, non-integrated corporations making independent sales are preferable
to vertically integrated firms making captive sales. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405
U.S. at 570. Non-integrated companies are independent companies that do not sell to a parent or
subsidiary. Between independents and captive sales are long-standing contractual relationships,
which are usually considered "captive sales." See Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co. 515 F.2d 835, 850
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
137. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
138. Id. at 424.
139. See notes 9-10, 134-35, supra and accompanying text,
140. For a discussion of actuality in potential production cases, see notes 82-122 supra and
accompanying text.
141. ITT Corp. v. GTE Corp. 518 F.2d 913, 933 (9th Cir 1975). This is directly analogous to
the exclusion of mere hypothetical potential production from the relevant market. See note 85
supra and accompanying text.
142. Companies in the market will hold down prices to preclude entry by these potential
competitors. See generally R. Posner, supra note 1, at 113-25 (advocating the elimination of the
doctrine); F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 482-83, 486; L. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 633-42.
143. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), a product market extension case,
the court found that a manufacturer of similar products had a procompetitive effect on the
market. Id. at 579. Because the acquisition eliminated this effect, the merger was invalidated. Id.
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the competitive effect of those not presently in the market and thus expand
the relevant market by considering this "outside the market" effect.'
Furthermore, the distinction between actual and merely hypothetical potential
production 4 5 is analogous to the distinction between the perceived potential
entrant and actual future entrant in potential competition.' 4 6 Potential production analysis rejects the mere hypothetical; 4 7 potential competition accepts both variants, although actual future entrants should be given more
weight. 148
Moreover, the concepts cannot be distinguished on the basis of the contexts
in which they arise. 149 Section 7 is meant to deal with probabilities and
incipience. 150 Relevant product market definitions should deal with
realities.' 5' Thus, ambiguity arguably could be resolved in favor of invalidating mergers under potential competition theory 15 2 and excluding potential
producers from the relevant product market. If there is to be consistency and
fairness in analyzing the sphere in which competition exists, however, potential competition and potential production should be both accepted and
applied.'- 3 Potential production analysis can prevent the potential competition theory from making relevant market definitions inapplicable. 5 4 When a
at 581. In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). a geographic extension
case, the defendant had a procompetitive effect on a market even when outside the geographic
market. Id. at 533-34 & n. 13. The Court remanded with instructions for the district court to
assess the elimination of this competitive effect. Id. at 537. Potential competition theory has also
been used as a means to evaluate joint ventures, United States v Penn-Olin Chem Co . 378 U S
158, 173-74 (1964), and vertical mergers, Ford Motor Co. v. United States. 405 U S 562. 567-70
(1972).
144. See notes 9-10, 142-43 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 88-98 supra and accompanying text.
146. Compare, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation. Inc., 418 U.S 602, 623-25,
639-40 (1974) (perceived potential entrant theory focusing on the present effect) and United States
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1973) (same) and Ford Motor Co- v United
States, 405 U.S. 562, 567, 569 (1972) (same) with, e.g., FTC v Atlantic Richfield Co.. 549 F 2d
289, 292-95 (4th Cir. 1977) (actual potential entrant focusing on the future effect) and Missouri
Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 863-65 (2d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 419
U.S. 883 (1974), and United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 367 F. Supp, 1226, 1232 tC.D Cal.
1973) (same) aff'd, 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
147. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
148. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.. 418 U S. 602, 605. 623-25, 632-40
(1974); BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 26-28 (2d Cir. 1977).
149. See Supply Substitutability, supra note 10, at 135 n.28
150. This is based on the statutory language of § 7 of the Clayton Act which makes illegal
mergers that "may ... lessen competition." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added). For the text
of § 7, see note 3 supra. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co , 378 U S 158. 173-74 (1964);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321. 362 (1963), Brown Shoe Co v United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
151. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text
152. This probability has bordered on the mere possible. See United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966).
153. Accord, Supply Substitutability, supra note 10, at 134-35
154. Relevant market questions may be rendered inapplicable when a competitive effect from
outside the market invalidates an act within the market. See Markovits. supra note 2. at 593
n.10.
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potential competitive effect has been eliminated, potential production analysis
would measure the importance of that effect. When potential producers
expand the relevant market, potential competition standards would measure
the competitive effect within the expanded sphere.
D. PracticableTurn
Finally, the alternate way of viewing the relevant geographic market set
out in Tampa Electric Coal Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 1ss supports the
acceptance of potential production analysis. In Tampa Electric, the Court
held that the relevant geographic market included those areas "to which the
purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.' Is 6 Applying this standard, the
Court concluded that the geographic market included areas that suppliers
could have, but had not, entered. 1s7 This broad geographic market definition
differs from traditional relevant product market analysis. Under product
analysis, the trier of fact examines the product and includes in the market
only those goods that can presently be substituted for the relevant productthe actual product substitutes. IS8 Under Tampa Electric, however, the trier of
fact includes in the geographical market all suppliers that could sell in the
area by overcoming slight geographic barriers to entry-the potential producers. 159 Thus, the production of these nearby suppliers is included in the
relevant product market when determining market share. 160 Similarly, potential producers capable of overcoming slight non-geographic barriers to entry
should be included in the relevant product market because geographic barriers are similar to other entry barriers. 161
155. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
156. Id. at 327 (emphasis added). This idea previously had only been stated In the negative.
If "purchasers cannot, as a practical matter, turn to suppliers outside their own area," the
geographic market can be restricted. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5
(1949). The positive statement in Tampa Electric reinforces the expansive definition of the
relevant market.
157. 365 U.S. at 331-32. The expansive geographic market definition might also have resulted
from a reversal of the usual position of the parties. Usually, an antitrust plaintiff asserts that the
defendant has violated antitrust law. In Tampa Electric, however, a seller sought to repudiate a
contract that the purchaser wanted to enforce. The seller alleged that it had violated § 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), by entering into the contract. See Brief for Petitioner at
52-58, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), reprinted in 7 Major Briefs,
supra note 45, at 339-44.
157. The Tampa Electric standard has been twice reaffirmed. United States v. Phlllipsburg
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 362 (1970); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 358-59 (1963). Lower courts regularly follow this standard. See, e.g., International Ry.
of Cent. America v. United Brancs Co., 532 F.2d 231, 240 n.18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
835 (1976); United States v. Trac'ndo Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 1979);
Optivision Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping Center Assocs., 472 F. Supp. 665, 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1979);
Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468, 492 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
158. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
159. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-29 (1961).
160. All relevant production within the relevant geographic market is included in determining
the market share. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
161. "The criteria to be used in determining the appropriate geographic market are essentially
similar to those used to determine the relevant product market." Brown Shoe Co. v. United
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Admittedly, different considerations may be involved in different analyses.
Nevertheless, these analogous situations demonstrate courts' recognition of
the competitive effect that can be exerted from the supply side, and support
the acceptance, with limitations, of potential production analysis.

M.

APPROPRIATE MARKETS FOR POTENTIAL PRODUCTION ANALYSIS

Potential production analysis may not be warranted in all cases., 6 2 There
are, however, at least three markets in which potential production analysis is
appropriate: markets of intermediaries; markets defined by a strong buyer;
and markets composed of highly differentiated goods.
A. Internediaries
Potential production analysis should be used when the identity of the buyer
is not clear or when the market is one that connects one group with another.
Such markets are dominated by brokers, franchisees, and other intermediaries. For example, in Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v. National
Educational Advertising Services, Inc., 163 the defendant allegedly
monopolized the service market connecting national advertisers with student
newspapers. 164 The district court found that the buyers were the national
advertisers and that they had reasonable alternative means of reaching
students. 65 Accordingly, it found a relevant market comprised of all companies that could connect advertisers with students. 166 The Seventh Circuit,
however, reasoned that both the advertisers and the college newspapers could
be considered buyers. 167 Because it was "possible for [the defendant] to lack
the requisite market power in one direction while achieving a complete
stranglehold in the other,"' 68 the court asserted that "two relevant market
determinations might be necessary."' 169 Although both supply and demand
factors can affect a market, 170 the relevant product market is the sphere of
effective competition, 17 ' and that sphere should not change depending on the
viewpoint of analysis. Thus, it is difficult to understand how two market
States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962); see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 593 (1966)
(Fortas, J., dissenting); Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 1972);
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.,
dissenting). See also R. Posner, supra note 1, at 42.
162. See notes 70-71, 82-85 supra and accompanying text; cf. United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974) (dismissing an anticompetitive effect as insignificant);
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333-34 (1961) (same).
163. 516 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975).
164. Id. at 1093.
165. The advertisers could have reached the student market through television, radio, direct
mail, and magazines. Id. at 1097.
166. Id. In defining the market as those connecting national advertisers with students, the
court ignored the role of college newspapers in defining the market. Id. The defendant provided a
service that was impractical otherwise. Id. at 1098.
167. Id. at 1099. The circuit court believed that the district court had erred on this point. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1098.
170. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.

171. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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definitions flow from one service. Nevertheless, the court found that the
student newspapers, not the national advertisers, were the buyers. 172 Accordingly, it remanded with instructions to analyze the relevant market from the
viewpoint of the newspapers. 173 This search for a buyer was both unnecessary
and inappropriate. Recognizing the singular market power of intermediaries
over the groups serviced, the court should have defined the market as those
companies capable of connecting the two groups. This requires both supply
and demand side analysis.
In Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 174 the
recognition of the singular position of an intermediary led to a straightforward
application of potential production analysis. In its counterclaim, the defendant had alleged that Twin City had monopolized the market of concession
services at major league baseball games. 75 The district court had accepted
defendant's argument and found the relevant product market to be provision
of concession services to major league baseball. 176 The Ninth Circuit, however, described the service in issue as the sale of food to the public and the
purchase of franchises from baseball teams. 1 77 Thus, the court recognized
that the concessionaires were intermediaries between baseball club owners
and food-consuming fans. Because major league baseball (supply) could turn
to various organizations to make food available to fans (demand), the court
held that the relevant product market included those companies that sold food
at leisure time activities-those capable of connecting the supply with the
demand-not only those selling to major league baseball fans. 178 Accordingly,
the case was remanded to determine the scope of this connecting market. 179
Unlike the Seventh Circuit in Cass, the Ninth Circuit in Twin City recognized
the competitive sphere in which an intermediary operated, and pursued the
proper approach by explicitly recognizing and analyzing the supply side effect
in a market of intermediaries.
B. Powerful Buyers
The presence of a powerful buyer' 80 also merits potential production
analysis. When the buyer possesses market power vastly superior to that of
172. 516 F.2d at 1099, This finding was based on the fact that the defendant required
contractual relations and commissions only of the college newspapers. Id.
173. Id. at 1099-1100. This misperception as to the nature of the market is not innocuous.
From the viewpoint of the newspapers, the defendant provided willing advertisement purchasers.
Other means of obtaining this income might include, for example, local businesses, To overlook
the role played by national advertisers would be to misunderstand the nature of the defendant's
service.
174.

175.
contract
176.
177.
178.
179.

512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).

Id. at 1269. The other issue in the litigation was the validity of the concessionaire
between the parties. This issue previously had been resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id. at 1272-73.
Id.

at 1273.

180. A market where many sellers serve one buyer is a monopsony; one with few buyers is an
oligopsony. See F. Scherer, supra note 11, at 239. The unfamiliarity of these terms, as compared
to the more common terms describing powerful sellers, like monopoly and oligopoly, corresponds
to a general lack of analysis. See id. at 239-52.
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the seller, that power can define the market. 18 ' Usually, the buyer has
comparatively little market power and the relevant product is defined as that
which is actually available. 1 2 A seller with comparatively little market
power, forced to tailor its business to the desires of the powerful buyer, should
also be in a market defined in terms of what is realistically available.18 3 A
small individual buyer has practicable access only to what the powerful seller
offers. A powerful buyer, on the other hand, has practicable access to what
the small individual seller has the potential to offer. Thus, a market with a
powerful buyer 4 should be defined as where that buyer can "practicably turn
for supplies.'

8

1

The effect that buyer characteristics have on the relevant product market is
already recognized. Evidence of different buyers can lead to a narrow market
based on that difference. 85 Furthermore, evidence of buyers exerting
pressure to receive discounts has supported a relevant product market including only sales to those powerful buyers.' 86 Courts have even defined the
relevant product market in terms of those manufacturers supplying a powerful buyer. 187 In Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 188 for example, the
district court defined the market as those companies that provided the
government with a particular squad radio. The court found that the defendant had monopoly power because it supplied the majority of the government's needs for that product. 189 In effect, a single buyer defined the market.
Ignoring a powerful buyer, one which is able to "play one seller off against the

181. See Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 944. 947 (S.D.N V. 1973),
aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 512 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1975). Even though most goods
ultimately go to consumers, there are many "intermediate transactions" where a powerful buyer
might intrude. F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 239.
182. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
183. See F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 249-50.
184. Tampa Elec. Coal Co. v Nashville Coal Co. 365 U.S. 320. 327 (1961). This analogizes
the relevant geographic market definition of Tampa Electric to a relevant product definition. See
notes 155-61 supra and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563. 574 (1966), CBS, Inc- v FTC.
414 F.2d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970)
186. Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70, 79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 US. 833 (1975),
187. See Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp.. 364 F. Supp. 944. 947 (SD N.Y- 1973).
aff'd per curian on other grounds, 512 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. Ford Motor Co. v United
States, 405 U.S. 562, 565 (1972) (Ford's market position permitted it to buy sparkplugs at below
production costs); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.. 353 U.S 586. 593-95 (1957)
(GM) (the market power of the automotive industry is arguably the rationale for finding a
market of automotive finishes, although the stated reason is that the product is peculiarly
appropriate for that market).
The Common Market recognizes the effect that a powerful buyer can have on a market.
Europemballage v. Commission, [19731 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 11971-1973 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)O 8171, annulling on other grounds, In re Continental Can Co_, [19711
J.0. Comm. Eur. (No. LT) 25 (1972), 11970-1972 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
9481 (a powerful buyer can have a significant affect on a product market).
188. 364 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 512 F-2d 442 (2d
Cir. 1975).
189. Id. at 947.
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others,"' 190 however, leads to a market definition that ignores the practical
effect of market power on the supply side. Thus, the Ovitron court should
have determined with whom the government could have signed a contract for
squad radios, rather than with whom the government had signed a contract.
Only this type of analysis will recognize all the competitive effects in a market
which includes a powerful buyer.
C. Highly DifferentiatedProducts
Potential production analysis is also appropriate in markets of highly
differentiated products in which goods are not interchangeable once produced. 191 In this situation, demand side analysis does not adequately explore
the scope of the market. Highly differentiated product markets are more
appropriately defined as the buyers that the seller can service. 192 For example, newspapers are highly differentiated products because old papers are not
reasonably interchangeable by readers for current ones. A newsstand selling
outdated papers could not compete with newsstands selling current papers.
Nevertheless, each day's paper is not in a separate market, despite this lack of
demand substitutability. 193 Rather, a relevant market of newspapers includes
194
the products of the businesses able to gather, print, and sell news.
Occasionally only a limited part of a highly differentiated product market
will meet the needs of particular buyers.1 95 Once a Ford is purchased, for
example, only a Ford piston can be used when repairs are needed. Courts
generally have been reluctant, however, to define the relevant market as the
196
defendant's product, preferring to focus on functional interchangeability.
This reluctance has often properly been coupled with potential production
analysis, most notably in markets of computer peripherals. 197 In ILC Periph190.

F. Scherer, supra note 1, at 250; see id. at 249-50.

191. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 552 (1971); Kaplan
v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 293-94 (9th Cir. 1979); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1,
10 (7th Cir. 1971). See generally L. Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 15, 18; note 11 supra and

accompanying text.
192. See Tampa Elec. Coal Co. v Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); notes 155-61
supra and accompanying text.

193.

See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 552 (1971); Citizen

Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133 (1969); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 145 (1951).
194. An implicit actuality requirement is included. Mere potential to produce newspapers is

not enough; some actual production must have been shown. A similar analysis is present in a
market of emblematic jewelry. See L.G. Balfour Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1971). In Balfour, the court held that to have separate markets for each fraternity "would deny
the realities of the market situation." 14. at 11.
195. See, e.g., Nelligan v. Ford Motor Co., 262 F.2d 556, 557 (4th Cir. 1959); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822
(1957); Advance Business Syss. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143, 153-54 (D. Md.

1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
196. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
197. E.g., Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 293-95 (9th Cir. 1979); Telex Corp. v.
IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 899 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); ILC Peripherals
v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 428-29 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub non. Memorex
Corp. v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-3050, 78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
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eral Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., "Isthe potential producers of IBM plugcompatible peripherals-the manufacturers of non-IBM plug-compatible
peripherals-were included in the relevant market.' 99 Thus, the court
explored the production potential of the manufacturers of products which
were functionally equivalent but not demand substitutes. Potential production
analysis, therefore, prevents an unfairly narrow market definition in a market
of high product differentiation which could result from a mechanical application of demand side analysis.
CONCLUSION

In the field of antitrust law, it may be "delusive to treat opinions written by
different judges at different times as pieces of a jig-saw puzzle which can be,
by effort, fitted correctly into a single pattern. ' 2 0 0 Nevertheless, the effort is
worthwhile. In defining the relevant product market, potential production has
long been a misplaced piece. Rather than setting this piece aside because it is not
amenable to the traditional approach, courts should strive systematically and
consistently to find where it fits in the overall puzzle. Only then will the goal
of a consistent and adequate framework that accounts for all competitive
effects be attained.
Robert L. Hubbard
198. 458 F. Supp.
Corp., Nos. 78-3050,
199. Id. at 429.
200. United States
per curiam, 347 U.S.

423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed sub nor. Memorex Corp. v. IBM
78-3236 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D.Mass. 1953), qff'd
521 (1954).

